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The introduction of compétition has given rise to important changes in
network industries. This is particularly true for télécommunications, in
which former protected monopolies hâve been exposed to compétition
by new operators in most industrialised countries. Deregulation has also
induced entry by new actors, from previously distinct industries (cable,
railroads, etc.).
An important dimension of this reorganization process consists in the
interaction between regulatory institutions. Indeed, new players are often
either unregulated (as for information technologies) or under the jurisdiction
of différent regulatory bodies (as for broadcasting and télécommunications),
although a substantial amount of regulatory oversight is still needed (for
interconnection or public service obligations for instance). This raises
important issues about the domain of specialization of thèse multiple
regulators, as well as about the coordination of their décisions.
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Récent research has started to study some of the trade-offs involved in
the design of regulatory institutions for thèse industries.1 For télécommuni
cations, the traditional paradigm for régulation is being called into question.
Some countries hâve even proceeded to a (partial) substitution of régula
tion by compétition policy. For instance, New Zealand had decided to give
up régulation and to rely solely on compétition policy as its new structure
for industry supervision, following the Commerce Act of 1986. Expérience
has shown, however, that this was not sufficient and a Ministerial Inquiry
into the régulation of télécommunications, released in September 2000, has
put forward the need for more régulation, in order to rule interconnection
and to reduce the market power of the incumbent. But economists still
cannot provide much guidance on either the transition from régulation to
compétition policy, or the interaction between thèse two modes of industry
supervision. The spécifie question that we try to address in this paper is
the following : When are the différent supervision authorities (i.e., régula
tion and compétition policy in our context) mainly substitutable, or mainly
complementary ?
Numerous forms of régulation and antitrust enforcement exist. Our
attempt therefore hinges on a bare-bone description of the functioning of
thèse institutions. We shall draw upon the following considérations. First,
regulatory agencies hâve wider control rights than antitrust authorities.
Indeed, the former engages in detailed régulation of activities whereas the
latter assesses ex post the lawfulness of conducts. Second, régulation usually
resorts to an ex ante contractual agreement whereas compétition policy
adopts an ex post monitoring of the industry, even though intervention
rules are usually determined ex ante. Third, regulatory agencies, with a
narrow mandate, often benefit from a much better knowledge of the industry
than antitrust authorities, that hâve a quasi-universai mandate : regulators
engage in a continuing and long-lasting relationship with a spécifie industry
whereas compétition policy authorities only intervene in a punctual way.
The framework we adopt can be described as follows. We consider
a dominant operator and a fringe producing differentiated (final) goods.
The fringe and the dominant operator are taken to hâve identical efficiency
parameters. The fringe is composed of firms that can décide to collude,
and therefore act as a monopoly, or to behave competitively, in which case
Bertrand-Nash compétition takes place in their market.
The dominant operator is supervised by a regulatory agency. This
agency offers a contract, which consists in the price of the regulated good
and a transfer given to this firm to cover its costs. We study the possibility of
complementing régulation with supervision of the fringe, by a compétition
policy authority. Throughout most of the analysis, we drastically simplify
our model by assuming that the compétition authority either intervenes - in
1 This literature often considers non-benevolent regulators, following the séminal work of Stigler (1971). This
strand of research focuses on the rôle of institutions on non-benevolent public policy decision-makers (or
supervisors in charge of acquiring information). See Laffont and Tirole {(1999), pp. 316-318), for a review
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which case she can deter, at no cost, the fringe from colluding - or does not
intervene, and lets the fringe act as a monopolist. Any considérations on
the cost of antitrust intervention, or on potential coordination problems
(due, say, to confiicting objectives) between regulatory and compétition
authorities would lessen the benefits of complementing régulation with
compétition policy. We are thus focusing on the case in which it is the
most bénéficiai, in a partially regulated environment, to add supervision of
the fringe to régulation of the dominant operator.
We first build upon the analysis of Laffont and Tirole (1990), (1993),
to study how the regulatory agency should départ from standard Ramsey-
Boiteux pricing to account for the fringe's incentive to collude. When the
fringe behaves competitively, there is no need to distort the price of the
regulated good since the regulator completely internalizes the social cost
of the unregulated good and the fringe behaves in a socially optimal way.
However, when the fringe colludes, the regulator must distort the provision
of the regulated good to implicitly subsidize the collusive fringe in order to
give it an incentive to increase its production. With substitutes, this requires
to increase the price of the regulated good, whereas with compléments, this
price has to be decreased in order to increase the demand faced by the
fringe.
We show that enforcing a compétitive behavior is always welfare-
enhancing when goods are compléments. Indeed, it not only increases
consumers' surplus, it also increases the revenue of the regulated firm,
thereby reducing the need for distortionary taxation.
This resuit does not hold with substitutes : when goods are strongly
substitutes, enforcing a compétitive behavior from the fringe is detrimental
to welfare. Indeed, a compétitive fringe strongly reduces the revenues from
the sale of the regulated good; this requires to increase the subsidy that
must be paid to the regulated firm, which has a social cost when public
funds are costly. When goods are weak substitutes, antitrust intervention
is always bénéficiai, since it enables to align the fringe's behavior with the
socially optimal one, and the loss caused by an increase in distortionary
taxation is not too large. Finally, the larger the cost of public funds is, the
larger is the degree of substitutability below which it is socially désirable
not to enforce compétitive pricing by the fringe.
Our model therefore shows that the substitutability/complementarity
between supervision authorities strongly dépends on the interaction between
final product markets.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section (Section 2)
we describe our model. We then study in Section 3 the gain obtained by
complementing régulation of the dominant operator with compétition policy
on the fringe. Section 4 présents various extensions of the initial setting.
And Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. Ail proofs are relegated to
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2 The model
To avoid confusion, a masculine pronoun will be used for the regulatory
agency, and a féminine one for the antitrust authority.
We consider a market for two goods, denoted by '1' and '2'. Good 1
is produced by a dominant operator, and good 2 by a fringe.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers dérive a gross surplus from the consumption of quantities q\ and
q2 given by
GS = a {qi + q2) - - [q] + ql) + cqiq2
Parameter c belongs to (—1,1) and indicates whether goods are demand
substitutes (c ^ 0) or compléments (c ^ 0).
The télécommunication industry, in which the dominant operator is in
charge of fixed telephony, provides us with examples of the two situations : if
the fringe is located on the mobile telephony sector, goods are substitutes2 ;
if on the other hand the fringe offers internet services, then goods are
complementary from the consumers' view point.
The associated demand function for good i is3
a(l 4- c) - pi - cpj .
We omit arguments to ease the présentation, when this cannot lead to
confusion. Accordingly, the net surplus derived by consumers is NS =
GS -
2.2 Firms
A fringe ensures the production of good 2. We assume, first, that the fringe
is composed of firms that produce at the same constant marginal cost 9 and,
second, that thèse firms can perfectly coordinate their décisions in order to
maximize their joint profits, given by ir2 = \p2 — 0] Q2- If the firms choose
not to cooperate, then Bertrand compétition takes place within the fringe,
leading to zéro profit in equilibrium. Thèse assumptions are, admittedly.
2 The substitutability between mobile and fixed telephony is a matter of debate among empirical economists,
for hardware components. Yet using one or the other type of telephony for each given call remains a choice
between substitute products.
3 Throughout the paper, we assume that the size of the market, a, is sufficiently large to ensure positive prices
and quantities. Since the second-order conditions associated to the various optimization problems studied
in the paper will be always satisfied, this ensures the existence of interior solutions.Cécile Aubert, Jérôme Pouyet 157
restrictive but will help us focus on our main issue : Is it always welfare-
enhancing to complément régulation with compétition policy ?
A dominant operator is in charge of the production of good 1. We
adopt the accounting convention that it receives the revenues from the
sales of this good. To abstract from considérations based on a différence
of efficiency between the fringe and the dominant operator, we assume that
the dominant operator's constant marginal cost is also 6.
This marginal cost of production, 0, is known by both the regulatory
agency and the compétition policy authority.
Finally, we assume that collusion between the fringe and the dominant
operator is not possible.4 It is often argued that intra-market collusion is
more easily achievable and enforceable than inter-markets collusion, absent
any 'external ways' such as mergers or cross-ownership of shares. Besides,
in our model, the regulator, who controls the dominant operator, might be
able to observe - and thus prevent - any collusive action jointly undertaken
by the regulated firm and the unregulated ones.
2.3 The regulatory agency
The regulatory agency only controls the dominant operator, and does not
regulate the fringe. Examples of such asymmetric régulation abound : In
the télécommunications industry for instance, former protected monopolies
are usually still under the jurisdiction of regulatory authorities whereas
entrants are typically only subject to light regulatory control. We assume
in addition that the quantity produced by the fringe is not contractible.
The regulator can thus propose a contract {ti,p\} to the regulated firm,
where p\ is the price required for good 1 and t\ is a monetary transfer to
compensate this firm for its production cost. The dominant operator's profit
function is therefore given by tti = [pi — 6]q\ +t\ -F, where F is a fixed
cost of production5.
We dénote by A > 0 the shadow cost of public funds. In our partial
equilibrium approach, A captures the fact that taxation is distortionary :
transferring one unit of money to the regulated firm requires to levy 1 + A
units from taxpayers6.
The welfare function is thus given by
SW = NS-(1 + X)ti + TTi + 7T2 (1)
= GS + Xpiqx - (1 + A)(^! + F) - 0q2 - Am (2)
4 See Aubert and Pouyet (1999) fora model of incomplète régulation of a dominant firm and potential collusion
between this firm and an unregulated competitor, under asymmetric information.
5 This fixed cost of production justifies the monopoly situation of the dominant firm for good 1, but it has no
qualitative impact on our results, as will be clear in the following. In particular, the justifications we obtain
for favoring - or preventing - antitrust intervention are indépendant from il.
6 We would hâve obtained similar results if we had assumed that the regulator collects the revenues associated
to the sales of good 1, and then pays the regulated firm a transfer. Similarly, if there was no fixed cost, the
subsidy would become a tax, and our results could be immediately reinterpreted.158 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
2.4 The timing
The compétition policy authority intervenes first ; the regulatory agency
then contracts with the dominant operator and détermines the price for
good 1; finally, the fringe chooses the price of good 2.7
2.5 The compétition policy authority
Given its incompleteness, the régulation of the dominant operator might be
complemented with supervision of the fringe. We assume that an antitrust
authority has access to a costless monitoring technology that enables her to
investigate the fringe's behavior and to détermine whether anti-competitive
actions hâve taken place.
Our goal is not to détermine the optimal antitrust intervention policy
but, rather, to study how compétition policy impacts the regulatory process.
Therefore, we drastically simplify the compétition authority's problem by
considering that, if she intervenes, then she can discover collusion by the
fringe at no cost and punish heavily the firms. Thus, the first stage in our
model simply consists in determining whether enforcing a non-cooperative
behavior from the fringe is better than letting collusion occur8. We shall
therefore consider the following two situations :
• Under 'antitrust intervention', the fringe is deterred from colluding and
behaves as a price-taker :
PT = 0, (3)
where superscript 'në stands for 'non collusive fringe'.
• Under 'no antitrust intervention', the fringe has an incentive to collude in
order to maximize joint profits :
Vl = ° + g +f -P'\ (4)
where superscript 'c' stands for 'collusive fringe'.
3 Optimal industry supervision
Letp2(pi,0) be the best-response of the (Stackelberg follower) fringe. Since
there is complète information, the regulatory contract {t\,pi} offered to
7 We comment on this assumption in Section 4.
8 Suppose that the antitrust authority possesses a monitoring technology that enables to detect collusion
when she intervenes on the fringe; suppose that her marginal cost of intervention is null for a given industry.
Then, she can intervene with probability 1 and totally deter collusion if the fine imposed in case of collusion
is sufficiently large; or she can let collusion occur when she does not intervene.Cécile Aubert, Jérôme Pouyet 159
the dominant operator only has to ascertain that this firm is willing to
participate, or9
IRx(e) : 7T! = [pi " 0]qi(PuP2(pu0)) +h-F^0
Since the dominant operator's profit is socially costly (see Equation (2)),
the regulatory agency will set the transfer <i so that the regulated firm
earns no rent : IR\ (9) is binding in equilibrium. Optimizing social welfare
with respect to price p\ yields the following first-order condition :
dSW\dql ^p2] S_\dqL dq^cfo] ,
dpi dp2 dpi J dq2 [ dpi dp2 dpi J dpi
As can be seen from Equation (5), différent effects guide the choice of the
price for good 1 by the regulatory agency. Their magnitude dépends on the
degree of compétition within the fringe.
3.1 Antitrust intervention : compétitive fringe
If the compétition policy authority décides to intervene, the fringe is
deterred from colluding and p2 = 0. This obviously implies that ^ = 0.
Moreover, since the fringe behaves in a socially efficient way. there is no need
for the regulator to alter the provision of good 1 to affect that of good 2
(i.e., Q§~ = p2 - 6 = 0). Thus, in the case of a compétitive fringe, Equation
(5) reduces to the standard Ramsey-Boiteux formula
where rji is the price elasticity of good 1, i.e., r)x = -^ JJ-. When the fringe
behaves competitively, the choice of the regulated price is only affected by
the direct effect of p\ on welfare. Since transfers are socially costly, the
regulatory agency must distort the price of good 1 away from its marginal
cost in order to reduce the subsidy given for cost-reimbursement purposes.
Equations (3) and (6) yield the equilibrium priées {p"c,P2°} and
enable to obtain the corresponding quantities {q?c, q%c}, which are explicitly
given in the Appendix.
3.2 No antitrust intervention : collusive fringe
In this case, the collusive fringe acts as a monopolist on its own market.
The regulatory agency would like to subsidize the fringe so as to induce
9 The outside opportunity of a regulated firm that would reject the regulatory contract is normalized to 0.160 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
a larger production of good 2. The only tool he can use is a réduction of
the demand for good 1 when goods are substitutes, or, equivalently, in this
case, an increase in p\. Similarly, for complementary goods, the regulatory
agency can only use a decrease in pi, so as to increase the demand for good
1, and therefore for good 2.
However, since the regulatory agency acts as the Stackleberg leader
of our game, the effect of p\ on the price chosen by the fringe also has to
be taken into account : when goods are demand substitutes, there exists a
countervailing incentive since the increase in p\ triggers an increase10 in p2
that finally leads to a decrease in q2. Similarly, with demand compléments,
decreasing p\ leads to an increase in p2 and therefore to a decrease in the
demand for good 2. In our model, the first effect dominâtes since
dq2 dq2 dp2 -c
dpx dp2 dp, 2(1 - c2)
The regulatory agency thus increases (decreases) p\ when goods are sub
stitutes (compléments), so as to account for the incentive of the collusive
fringe to reduce its production.
Similarly, the choice of the price of the regulated good 1 must now
account for the indirect effect of p2 on q\. When the fringe colludes, the
price of good 1 tends to be larger since this always leads to an increase in
<7i through the reaction of the fringe (i.e., fj^f^- = 2(i-c2) ^ ^)-
One obtains the following rewriting of the first-order condition asso-
ciated to p\ when the fringe colludes :
p\-9 pT-Ô 1 r2A
ï ~ T (HA)(22)Lc
The distortion in the price relative to marginal cost is similar to the standard
Ramsey-Boiteux formula, but two additional effects arise, as can be seen
from the additional components in Equation (7) : first, the regulator takes
into account the fact that the price of good 1 influences the collusive price
for good 2, from (4), and therefore welfare; second, he tends to compensate
for the margin added to marginal cost 9 by the collusive fringe when it sets
the price of good 2. The two effects are weighted according to the degree of
complementarity and to the cost of public funds.
Equilibrium priées {pl,p2} and quantities {q^q^} are given in the
Appendix.
10 Priées are stratégie compléments with demand substitutes.Cécile Aubert, Jérôme Pouyet 161
3.3 Comparison
Let us now consider the décision by the antitrust authority, in the first
period, to intervene or to let collusion occur.
Proposition 1 With substitutes,
• the price of the regulated good is larger when the fringe colludes than when
it behaves competitively,
• the regulated dominant operator produces more when the fringe colludes
than when it behaves competitively.
With compléments, the reverse results hold.
Proof See Appendix A. o
First, the behavior of the fringe directly affects the demand for the
regulated good : since a collusive fringe sets a higher price than a compétitive
one, collusion increases the demand for the regulated good 1 when goods
are substitutes —and decreases it with compléments.
Second, as explained previously, the regulator takes into account the
incentive of the collusive fringe to under-produce : he tends to increase the
price of good 1 with substitutes, and to decrease it with complementary
outputs. This gives rise to an effect, on the demand for the regulated good,
that goes against the previous one.
To pave the road for the next proposition, let us now consider the
revenue earned from the regulated good. More specifically, let us assume for
the moment that the shadow cost of public funds is very large. Then. we
obtain
which is négative with substitutes, and positive with compléments. This
means that when goods are substitutes, the net revenue generated from the
sale of the regulated good is larger when the fringe colludes than when it
competes. As a conséquence, still with substitutable goods, the subsidy that
must be paid to the dominant operator is larger when the fringe behaves
competitively than when it colludes. In our model, this is not welfare-
neutral since taxation is distortionary. And the deadweight loss associated
to this subsidy increases with the cost of public funds. A reverse conclusion
arises with compléments : enforcing a compétitive behavior from the fringe
increases the revenue associated to the sale of the regulated production,
which in turns alleviates the need for distortionary taxation.
The case of an infinité shadow cost of public funds is obviously
unrealistic. The following proposition applies for finite values of A.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique threshold d{\) e ( — 1,0) such that
• the compétition policy authority does not intervene and lets the fringe
collude if c ^ c'(X),162 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
• the compétition policy authority intervenes and prevents the fringe from
colluding if c ^ c'(À).
Moreover, the threshold c'(A) is increasing in A ^ 0.
Proof See Appendix B. d
The two effects at work are the following. First, enforcing a non-
cooperative behavior from the fringe always increases consumer surplus -
since the fringe then behaves in a socially optimal way. Second, compétition
by the fringe affects the transfer that must be paid to the regulated firm.
Indeed, when goods are substitutes, the compétitive behavior of the fringe
leads to an increase in this transfer and, thus, to a distortion due to the
social cost of taxation. When goods are compléments, on the other hand,
a compétitive behavior decreases the need for such distortionary taxation :
a compétitive fringe produces a larger quantity, which raises consumers'
willingness to pay for the regulated good, and therefore reduces the transfer
given to the regulated dominant operator.
The two effects go in the same direction and contribute to making
antitrust intervention désirable for compléments. But they go against one
another when goods are substitutes.
Thèse results can be contrasted to the ones for standard Cournot
compétition, without régulation : In such a framework, one would rather
tolerate collusion when goods are compléments. Indeed, with compléments,
collusion enables firms to internalize the positive externalities arising from
réductions in priées, leading to larger price réductions compared to the
compétitive price under Cournot compétition. To the contrary, antitrust
intervention would be more needed when goods are substitutes, since
collusion then leads to higher priées. A major différence between our
framework and the 'standard' one is that collusion does not take place
between firms producing differentiated goods — the regulated monopoly
does not collude with the fringe. Since the regulator maximizes consumer
surplus, the effects of price réductions are internalized even when there is
no collusion between the fringe and the dominant firm.
4 Discussion
We examine below whether our results are robust to various assumptions.
• Cournot compétition : Let us consider that there is Cournot compétition
between markets. Assume first that if the antitrust authority intervenes
then the fringe still sets a price equal to its marginal cost. Our insights
carry over to that situation11 : if products are sufRciently substitutable,
then it becomes socially préférable to let the fringe collude; otherwise,
11 Proofs are available from the authors upon request.Cécile Aubert, Jérôme Pouyet 163
antitrust intervention on the fringe is socially désirable. Although the
value of the threshold is différent, the nature of the compétition between
markets has little impact on our results. The intuitions remain the
same.\ Assume now that if the fringe behaves competitively, then Cournot
compétition also takes place within the fringe; in that case the price set
by a compétitive fringe would be différent from the fringe's marginal cost
and would no longer be socially efficient. The larger the number of fîrms
in the fringe becomes, the larger is the increase in consumers' surplus
generated by compétition; However, an increase in the number of firms
also reinforces the impact of compétition on the size of the subsidy paid to
the dominant operator. The complexity of the mathematical expressions
make it difficult to obtain a formai resuit ; simple simulations indicate
that, in our framework, when the number of fîrms in the fringe increases,
the zone of parameter values such that antitrust intervention is socially
préférable, shrinks.
• Intermediate forms of antitrust intervention : The way we hâve formalized
the intervention of the compétition policy authority is rather crude. One
might for instance consider that the authority can commit to a certain
probability of intervention. To keep the modeling as simple as possible,
let us consider that the fringe's reaction function is given by :12
a(l + c)a + 9 — capi
P-2 = =— (8)
1 + a v }
We acknowledge that this is a rather ad hoc way of modeling antitrust in
tervention. Parameter a is nevertheless a short-cut to model the intensity
of antitrust intervention. If a = 0 then the fringe behaves competitively;
if a = 1 the fringe acts as a monopolist; the price set by the fringe is
increasing with a. We dénote by à the value of the antitrust intervention
parameter that maximizes social welfare, which is decided prior to the
regulatory contract. Then, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider that the fringe 's réaction function is given by (8).
Then, the optimal antitrust intervention policy is defined as follows :
- When products are strong substitutes, the compétition authority lets the
fringe collude (i.e., à = 1).
- When products are weak substitutes, the compétition authority allows
some collusion (i.e., à G (0,1)).
- When products are compléments, the compétition authority completely
deters the fringe from colluding (i.e., à = 0).
Proof See Appendix C. D
Let us focus on the case of weak substitutes. à is decreasing with
c:the weaker the substitutability is, the weaker is the impact of the
12 This is obtained when the first-order condition characterizing the collusive fringe's reaction function is164 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
fringe's behavior on the dominant operator's revenue, and the less socially
profitable it is to let the fringe collude. For weak substitutes, the antitrust
authority accepts an intermediate level of collusive behavior at the level
of the fringe.
• Simultaneous timing : In that case, the regulator would no longer be able
to alter the fringe's production décision. Notice that this is already the
case when the fringe behaves competitively since it priées at marginal cost,
whatever the regulated firm's priée. Therefore, the only change concerns
the case of a collusive fringe. Not surprisingly, our results still carry
over to this case. The interesting différence is that the threshold (above
which the fringe is deterred from colluding) is smaller under simultaneous
timing than under sequential timing. The intuition is that the regulator
cannot influence the décisions taken by the fringe; antitrust intervention
is therefore more désirable since it can counter the incentive of the fringe
to under-produce under collusion.
• Asymmetric information : Incomplète information from the side of the re
gulator also leaves our results qualitatively unchanged.13 The rent extra
ction phenomenon that arises under incomplète information is somewhat
orthogonal to our focus. Qualitative results are unchanged; indeed, compé
tition on the fringe reduces the rent of the firm when goods are substitutes,
and increases it when goods are compléments.
5 Conclusion
We hâve tried to highlight in our model some of the effects that may
guide the design of an optimal industry supervision. The most striking
resuit is that antitrust intervention might not always enhance welfare in
partially regulated environments, even when there are no coordination
problem between regulatory and compétition policy authorities, and when
antitrust intervention is costless. Moreover, our model highlights a new
insight : the nature of the interaction between final goods affects the nature
of the interaction between supervision authorities.
With complementary products, antitrust intervention always increases
welfare, through two channels : the increase in consurners' surplus, and the
réduction in distortionary taxation. Thus, in présence of complementarities,
a rationale arises for a complète supervision of ail the firms active in the
industry (fringe and dominant operator in our model).
A question that then arises is the following : In our model, could an
titrust intervention replace regulatory oversight of the dominant operator ?
The answer will be négative in gênerai14. Indeed, antitrust enforcement
13 Compilations are available at www.enpc.fr/ceras/pouyet.
14 For instance, assume that F = 0 and A = 0. Then one could check immediately that régulation of the
dominant operator only is atways preferred to antitrust intervention on the fringe only. The (obvious) reasonsCécile Aubert, Jérôme Pouyet 165
cannot counter the tendency to under-produce of the dominant operator; at
most, it can deter the fringe from colluding (and possibly deter the domi
nant operator from colluding with the fringe), but this precisely reinforces
the market power of the dominant operator when outputs are complemen-
tary. Finally, in a similar framework to the one used in this paper, Pouyet
and Verouden (2001) study the optimal antitrust intervention policy when
none of the markets are monopolized. They find that. when goods are stron-
gly complementary, the compétition policy authority is forced to intervene
with probability 1 in both markets. highlighting the inability of compétition
authorities (in the traditional vision) to cope alone with markets exhibiting
a pattern of strong complementarities.
On the other hand. in présence of strong substitutes, enforcing
a compétitive behavior would put a strong compétitive pressure on an
unregulated dominant operator. One would then like to compare the
following situations : régulation of the dominant operator only. or antitrust
intervention on the fringe only. Such a comparison relies on exogenous
parameters (the cost of public funds on one hand, and the cost of antitrust
intervention on the other hand) and clearly calls for a deeper understanding
of the functioning of thèse two institutions.
This paper constitutes a first step towards such a better understan
ding. But much remains to be done in order to answer the daunting questions
that arise when one considers the interactions between antitrust and régula
tion. In particular, why are there two différent bodies instead of a regulator
also endowed with auditing capacities ? Séparation cannot be justified15 in
our simple framework, except for reasons based on bounded rationality. As-
suming that the authorities can hâve private objectives allows to obtain
more complex justifications; séparation may indeed be optimal when there
is a risk of capture of the authorities by the industry (see Laffont and Mar-
timort (1999)). Another interesting question is the following : why are anti
trust authorities generally given a différent mandate than regulatory ones ?
Again, in our framework, there would be no justification for that. Spulber
and Besanko (1992) offer a rationale for asking antitrust authorities to take
only into account consumer surplus, and not firms profits. In their frame
work, giving this objective to the antitrust authority is a way of committing
to an (ex post ineffîcient) intervention in order to deter collusion. But the
introduction of a regulated transfer financed through distortionary taxation
increases the cost of distorting the objective of the compétition authority in
our model, especially when the cost of public funds is large (for example in
are the following. First, the regulator possesses a broader set of instruments than the antitrust authority.
Second, he can intervene ex ante (that is, before the production décisions are undertaken at the industry's
level), and therefore use this Stackelberg leadership to account for the interaction between the dominant
operator's and the fringe's décisions. When the shadow cost of public funds is not too large (a realistic
assumption for many developed countries), this reasoning still holds.
15 This séparation has nevertheless no cost, since we assume perfect coopération.166 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
developing countries)16. Thèse main questions constitute promising avenues
for further research.
Appendices
A - Proof of Proposition 1
We hâve
Similarly, we hâve
_e _ a(l + c)|2(2-c)A-c] + [4(l+A)+c(l-2A-2c(l+A)))fl
Pi ~ 4-3ca+4(2-cJ)A '
«c _ 1 LM , -\ , a a(H-c)(2(2-c)A-c)+[4(l+A)+c(l-2A-2c(l+A))1fl]
P2— 2 [a^L + C) + V ~~ C 4-3c2+4(2-c2)A J '
and
_ (4-t-c3)(l + A)-c(l + 2A)-C2(3 + 2A) _
Ql~ (l-c)(4-3c2+4(2-c2)A) { h
c 2(l + 2A)-2cA-c2(l + A)
Q2 ~ (1 - c)(4 - 3c2 + 4(2 - C2)A){a U)
Straightforward computations show that
nnc nc c(l + c) l + A(4-3c + 4(l-c)A)
Pl ~Pl~(l+2X) 43c2 + 4(2
The sign of this expression only dépends on the sign of c.
Straightforward computations also show that
q ql= °(1 -c)(l + 2A)(4 - 3c2 + 4(2 - <?)
where Pt(A) = (1 + 2A)2 + cX - c2(l + A)(l + 2A). We hâve Pi (A) =
4(1 + 2A) + c - c2(3 + 4A) ^ 0 VA ^ 0 and P,(0) = 1 - c2 > 0;thus,
16 Our simple model could be extended to take into account différent objectives for the two authorities, but there
would be no justification for thèse objectives. In addition, this extension would require ad hoc assumptions
on whether consumera are also taxpayers - in which case the major effects we hâve underlined in this
paper shoutd remain : there would still be a trade-off between increasing consumer surplus and limittng
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P(\) > 0, VA > 0. The sign of ç"c - gf therefore only dépends on the sign
of c.
B - Proof of Proposition 2
Let SWnc and SWC be the welfare levels when the fringe behaves competi-
tively and when it colludes respectively. Their différence is
- (l + c)(a-g)2
where P2(c) = -(1 + 2cA)(l + 2A)2 + c2(l + 4A + 8A2 + 6A3). P2(.) admits





Dénote by c'(A) the négative root : for ail c G (-1. c'(A)], SWC - SWnc ^ 0
and for ail c G [c'(A), 1), SWC - SWnc ^ 0. Finally, it is trivial to show that
d{.) is an increasing function of A ^ 0 and that c'(0) = -1.
C - Proof of Corollary 1
Given the fringe's reaction function, we hâve :
dSW ^ cA(l + A) + a(l - c)[l + 2A + c(l + A)2]
The denominator is always négative.
When products are compléments, we hâve —-— < 0.
da
Consider now that products are substitutes.
_CA(1+A) u - j. . , .. . , , ,
a — (i-c)[i+2A+c(i+A)i) can be an intenor solution provided that
af^ < 0 and à e [0,1]. A necessary and sufïïcient condition for
â ^ 0 is c ^ -c(^\)'i- A necessary and sufficient condition for à ^ 1 is
c ^ c(A), with 0 > c(A) ^ - À+^j.
Consider first that the second-order condition is satisfied or 1 -I- 2A —
c2(l + A)2 ^ 0. Consider now that c e [-^^^(A)]. Then, the second-
order condition is satisfied but we must hâve à = 1.
Now consider that (1 + 2A) - c2(l + A)2 < 0;this implies that
1 + 2A + c(l + A)2 < 0 and that ^f^ > 0.168 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(2), 2004
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